“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”
—Plato, Euthyphro
With these words, Socrates set forth a dilemma that still challenges theists today: Does God command what is good because it is good, or is it good because God commands it? The first horn implies that “good” has a value independent of God, and therefore God can’t be its source. The second horn implies that “goodness” is arbitrary, that the statement “God is good” is meaningless because a tautology (“God is good” = “God is God”), and that it argues from a putative fact to a statement of value.
Let’s recast the argument into formal logical terms:
1. If God commands m because m is objectively good, then m’s goodness is independent of God.
2. If m is good because God commands m, then m’s goodness is contingent: theoretically, He could have commanded ~m, and we would in that case call ~m “good”. Because it’s contingent, it can’t be objective in nature.
3. Either God commands m because m is good, or m is good because God commands it.
4. Therefore, either God did not create goodness, or goodness is arbitrary.