I have what I hope will be my final thoughts on the issue here. But, as Harry S. Truman said, "Never say 'never', 'cause never's a helluva long time."
* * *
The law falls silent in the midst of arms.
—CiceroThe mere fact that war has broken out does not mean that everything becomes licit between the warring parties.
—Gaudium et Spes, 79 § 3 (cf. CCC 2312)
For the last two weeks, the Catholic blogosphere has been rather turbulent with the burning question: Were Lila Rose and LiveAction justified in securing the videos exposing some of Planned Parenthood’s corrupt activities through pretense? Is lying justified in the fight against abortion? Is it ever justified?
A quick survey of the answers:
Consider killing in self-defense, or in defense of the lives of others. In a situation where a hostile person presents an immediate and direct threat of death, and non-lethal means of preventing innocent lives from being taken are practically unavailable, killing is considered licit (CCC 2263-2265). Under very strict conditions, war is considered just even though it inevitably entails the commission of many evils by many people to many people, limit these how we might (CCC 2309-2312). The acts themselves remain intrinsically evil, and to be avoided whenever humanly and morally possible. In practical terms, though, they’re not always avoidable and not always the worst evil present.
I’m not happy about either the “hiding the Jews from the Nazis” or “ticking time bomb” scenarios used by most of the previous writers, because I’m not convinced that either scenario as presented is realistic.
It would be one thing if, while walking down the street in Amsterdam, a Gestapo officer accosted you and asked, “Do you know of any Jews being hidden by any of your neighbors?” It would be another if the Gestapo were tearing your house apart with ruthless efficiency (fear, surprise, and an almost fanatical devotion to the Führer) while the officer in charge screamed at you, “Where are they hidden, you traitor!?” In the second case, a lie wouldn’t protect the Jews any more effectively than silence (cf. CCC 2489), and your fate is pretty much sealed anyway (not the comfy chair), so just shut up.
In the second scenario: Wouldn’t sodium pentothal be just as effective?
It seems to me, then, that to construct a “just lie doctrine”, you’d have to fulfill several conditions:
- Reginaldus, New Theological Movement: It’s a sin to lie, even to Planned Parenthood. (Note to self: never embed your conclusion in your title.)
- Carolyn Moynihan, Mercatornet: Entrapment is too much of a sticky wicket; even MSM journalists are backing away from it.
- Richard Collins, Linen on the Hedgerow: Of course you may lie; you can be a saint and lie. (See the note under Reginaldus.)
- Christopher Tollefson, Public Discourse: A movement built on truth shouldn’t win its victories by lies.
- Joseph Bottum, CatholicVote.org: Tollefson’s argument is “ultracrepidarian”.
- Pia di Solenni, CatholicVote.org: There are modifiers; refer to CCC 2488-2489.
- Christopher Kaczor, Public Discourse: “… [T]he basic strategies undertaken by Live Action need not involve intrinsically evil acts that must always be avoided whatever the cost.”
- Steve Kellmeyer, The Fifth Column: Lila Rose and LiveAction are wrong.
- Dawn Eden and William Doino, Jr., Busted Halo: See Tollefson.
- Mark Shea, National Catholic Register: Dawn Eden is right, darn it! (Doesn’t quite count, because you’d have had to have seen Ms. Eden’s opinion before; still ….)
- Joe Hargrave, The American Catholic: The issue is debatable, but one shouldn’t hold such a firm position that being a heretic is preferable to accepting a Church definition in the opposite direction. (First nominee for the 2011 Defensor Fidei Award!)
- John Zmirak, InsideCatholic: "We don't need to pervert our image of God such that we believe He is pleased at our Pharisaical observance of the law, even when it results in the death of the innocent."
- Peter Kreeft, CatholicVote.org (guest): The “lying is always wrong” position verges into Pharisaic legalism.
Of all the defenses of Lila Rose, Kreeft brings up the most salient point, which can be summed up in a quote from Isaac Asimov’s Foundation: “Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right.”
Grant that there moral absolutes. Grant that there are actions which are intrinsically evil. Grant that honesty is, in most cases, truly the best policy, and that the end doesn’t justify the means.
The question is not whether lying is intrinsically evil. It is. The question is whether it’s so evil and depraved that one must never lie regardless of the consequences of telling the truth.
And this is precisely where the wicket gets sticky, because many “culture of death” rationalizations end with the words, “Wouldn’t evil x be better for P than suffering evil y?” At the same time, while the end doesn’t justify the means, the end isn’t therefore irrelevant.
Consider killing in self-defense, or in defense of the lives of others. In a situation where a hostile person presents an immediate and direct threat of death, and non-lethal means of preventing innocent lives from being taken are practically unavailable, killing is considered licit (CCC 2263-2265). Under very strict conditions, war is considered just even though it inevitably entails the commission of many evils by many people to many people, limit these how we might (CCC 2309-2312). The acts themselves remain intrinsically evil, and to be avoided whenever humanly and morally possible. In practical terms, though, they’re not always avoidable and not always the worst evil present.
I’m not happy about either the “hiding the Jews from the Nazis” or “ticking time bomb” scenarios used by most of the previous writers, because I’m not convinced that either scenario as presented is realistic.
It would be one thing if, while walking down the street in Amsterdam, a Gestapo officer accosted you and asked, “Do you know of any Jews being hidden by any of your neighbors?” It would be another if the Gestapo were tearing your house apart with ruthless efficiency (fear, surprise, and an almost fanatical devotion to the Führer) while the officer in charge screamed at you, “Where are they hidden, you traitor!?” In the second case, a lie wouldn’t protect the Jews any more effectively than silence (cf. CCC 2489), and your fate is pretty much sealed anyway (not the comfy chair), so just shut up.
In the second scenario: Wouldn’t sodium pentothal be just as effective?
It seems to me, then, that to construct a “just lie doctrine”, you’d have to fulfill several conditions:
- The person is unable to evade the circumstances through other morally licit means;
- The evil act to be prevented is real and immediate, not remote, theoretical or probable;
- The person lying is morally certain the person to whom he intends to lie will commit a greater intrinsically evil act, whether as a result of the truth or regardless of the truth;
- The lie has a reasonable chance of either preventing the evil act or delaying its execution sufficiently to allow other means of preventing it;
- An evasion or silence would not be as effective or more effective in preventing or delaying the evil act.
While I can construct a doctrine to cover a “defensive lie” (that is, a lie meant to directly protect other people), I have a hard time believing Lila Rose’s lies to be defensive save in theory. Rather, they’re provocative, intended to elicit specific responses which may or may not be routine evils.
In war, value sets can get turned upside-down and inside-out. There is something to Dr. Kreeft’s argument about the first act of the mind, the one that says, “Are you kidding? Of course it’s okay for LiveAction to do that!” But do our hearts leap to that answer because it is okay … or because we loathe Planned Barrenhood so much that we want it to be okay?
What scruples can we sacrifice in a culture war?
Addendum—February 20, 2011
It should be clear that I'm not entirely satisfied with my own "just lie doctrine", let alone any of the other arguments promoted to absolve Lila Rose and LiveAction of sin. But neither am I convinced that all intrinsic evils are equal.
It seems to me there are two dangers involved. On the one hand, Scripture and Tradition are clear that we ought not "persist in sin, that grace may abound" (Rom 6:1-2), so a consequentialist attitude towards sin is utterly out of court. On the other hand, Dr. Kreeft rightly points out that a Kantian legalism has its own danger: not only can it tie our hands, preventing us from preventing evil, it can also be used as justification for shirking our obligations towards those for whom we are responsible.
Like it or not, we instinctively recognize that some evils are worse than others. That's why we have a distinction between venial and mortal sins. That's also why the test case of hiding Jews in Nazi Germany touches the issue of lying so closely: while in theory the Gestapo officer who asks "Do you know where Jews are being hidden?" is entitled to the truth, we instinctively recognize that giving the true answer—"Yes, let me show you where they are"—will lead to an incalculably worse result than saying, "No, so sorry, I don't." The injury done the Gestapo officer can hardly be considered "grave matter"; the internment and execution of the Jews, however, would be extremely grave and you would be guilty of participating in it if you told the truth. And that's why so many people instinctively shrink back from the idea that lying is never, never, never permissible.
Addendum—February 20, 2011
It should be clear that I'm not entirely satisfied with my own "just lie doctrine", let alone any of the other arguments promoted to absolve Lila Rose and LiveAction of sin. But neither am I convinced that all intrinsic evils are equal.
It seems to me there are two dangers involved. On the one hand, Scripture and Tradition are clear that we ought not "persist in sin, that grace may abound" (Rom 6:1-2), so a consequentialist attitude towards sin is utterly out of court. On the other hand, Dr. Kreeft rightly points out that a Kantian legalism has its own danger: not only can it tie our hands, preventing us from preventing evil, it can also be used as justification for shirking our obligations towards those for whom we are responsible.
Like it or not, we instinctively recognize that some evils are worse than others. That's why we have a distinction between venial and mortal sins. That's also why the test case of hiding Jews in Nazi Germany touches the issue of lying so closely: while in theory the Gestapo officer who asks "Do you know where Jews are being hidden?" is entitled to the truth, we instinctively recognize that giving the true answer—"Yes, let me show you where they are"—will lead to an incalculably worse result than saying, "No, so sorry, I don't." The injury done the Gestapo officer can hardly be considered "grave matter"; the internment and execution of the Jews, however, would be extremely grave and you would be guilty of participating in it if you told the truth. And that's why so many people instinctively shrink back from the idea that lying is never, never, never permissible.
However, neither the "Jews hidden in the attic" nor the "ticking time bomb" scenarios are equipped to deal with entrapment journalism. In both scenarios, we're looking at a choice forced on a person by circumstances beyond his/her control; with entrapment journalism, the journalist is the creator and, to a great extent, the controller of the event. With the first two scenarios, the lie is essentially defensive, injuring one party only as necessary as will protect other parties; with entrapment journalism, the lie is provocative, pushing the other person into self-incrimination.
Whatever else you can say about LiveAction's videos, they weren't demanded by the kind or degree of necessity that pertains to the usual justifications for lies. So I don't believe it's Pharisaical or Kantian to call their actions objectively wrong, as much as I'd like to be grateful for the help they provide.
